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Passenger Carrier's Liability Extended Beyond Its 
Own Line by Ticket Sale Transaction-
Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc.* 
[Vol. 6!1 
Plaintiff, a Negro woman, purchased a roundtrip bus ticket in 
New York City for travel between there and Montgomery, Alabama. 
The ticket was sold by defendant, an interstate common carrier 
licensed to do business in New York, and consisted of a strip of 
coupon tickets, each good for a separate portion of the journey over 
the lines of defendant and other independent carriers. Printed on the 
back of each coupon was a clause limiting defendant's liability to 
its own line.1 Defendant received a ten per cent commission on 
those connecting tickets it sold for the other lines, and on the 
face of those tickets there was the statement that they had been 
issued "for the account of" defendant. Plaintiff was assured by 
defendant's ticket agent that she would have a seat throughout the 
trip. In the course of the trip, after plaintiff had changed buses 
to that of an independent line, she was asked by the driver to move 
from her seat to one in the rear of the bus in order to accommodate 
a white passenger. When plaintiff refused, the bus continued to a 
town in Georgia where the driver left the bus and returned with 
a policeman, who told her to move to the back. Plaintiff again 
refused and the officer ordered her to leave the bus. While she was 
doing so, he shoved her and hit her on the head, causing serious 
injury. After receiving hospital treatment, plaintiff returned to 
New York where she instituted a personal injury action against 
defendant. At trial without jury, held, judgment for plaintiff for 
five thousand dollars. Although the issuing carrier would not 
ordinarily be liable for the torts of a connecting carrier, factors 
indicating that the transaction involved more than a mere sale of 
a ticket served to vitiate the effect of the exculpatory clause limit-
ing the common carrier's liability to its own line. 
About the tum of the century, ·American courts were divided 
on the issue of whether an initial carrier who sold a through ticket,2 
involving travel on both its own and connecting lines, was liable to 
passengers for injuries occurring on the other lines in the course 
of the journey. 3 Most courts, however, were in agreement that the 
• 230 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), appeal docketed, No. 29064, 2d Cir., 1964. 
1. The disclaimer clause read as follows: "In selling this ticket and checking 
baggage thereon the selling carrier acts only as agent and is not responsible beyond 
its own line and does not assume expense of transfer at any junction or guarantee 
any connections." 
2. A through ticket is one issued by the initial carrier which is valid to the 
destination, even though it is beyond the limits of the initial carrier's line and, 
thus, involves travel over a connecting carrier. 
3. Compare Central R.R. v. Combs, 70 Ga. 533 (1883) and Louisville & N.R.R. v. 
Spurling, 160 Ky. 819, 170 S.W. 192 (1914), with Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 
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initial carrier could limit liability to its own line through the use of 
a disclaimer clause similar to that used by defendant in the princi-
pal case.~ There have been no intervening federal statutory provi-
sions concerning liability to interstate passengers, and this latter 
view has persisted to the present.5 Generally, however, courts have 
limited the effect of these exculpatory clauses in two instances: 
They have refused enforcement of the clauses when it has been 
proved that the carriers involved have formed a partnership or 
joint venture; 6 and some courts have required that the passenger 
have actual notice of the clause for it effectively to limit liability.7 
On the other hand, it has been recognized that a carrier may 
contract with the passenger to extend its liability, and when the 
existence of such an agreement is in issue, the disclaimer clause is 
of only evidentiary value, albeit of considerable weight, as to the 
parties' intention.8 
Initially, the court in the principal case recognized the general 
rule that the exculpatory declaration on the back of the tickets 
would normally be effective for the defendant to avoid liability.9 
However, plaintiff contended that the presence of three factors 
indicated that the sale of the bus ticket constituted a special 
contract, by which defendant itself had undertaken the responsi-
bility of transporting her to her destination. In ruling for plaintiff, 
the court adopted these contentions and set out the three factors 
as the basis for holding defendant liable despite the exculpatory 
provision. 
First, the court alluded to the receipt by the defendant of a 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 318, 324 (1872) and Pennsylvania Co. v. Loftis, 72 Ohio St. 288, 
295, 74 N.E. 179, 182 (1905). 
4. See, e.g., Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929); Missouri Pac. 
R.R. v. Prude, 265 U.S. 99 (1924). 
5. See, e.g., Spears v. Transcontinental Bus Sys., 226 F.2d 94 (9th Cir. 1955); Solo• 
mon v. Pennsylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Morrison v. Pennsylvania 
R.R., 6 Fed. Carr. Cas. 2013 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Webb, 248 
S.W.2d 429 (Ky. 1952). But see Berry v. Pennsylvania R.R., 80 N.J. Super. 321, 193 
A.2d 569 (1963), which rejects in theory the validity of the disclaimer clause, although 
holding Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Chatters, supra note 4, controlling. 
6. See Wooten v. Pennsylvania R.R., 288 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1961); Gates v. 
Greyhound Corp., 197 F. Supp. 341 (S.D. Miss. 1960). Similarly, the disclaimer will 
not exonerate the initial carrier of its own negligence, no matter where occurring 
on the trip. See Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Chatters, supra note 4, at 331; Wooten v. 
Pennsylvania R.R., supra. 
7. Although it seemed to have been settled by Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Prude, 265 
U.S. 99 (1924), that the passenger was bound by the ticket provisions, a state court 
has recently held otherwise. Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958). See Note, 33 MARQ. L. REv. 196 (1950); annotation accompany-
ing the report of the Prude case, supra, 68 L. Ed. 922 (1924). 
8. See Morrison v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 Fed. Carr. Cas. 2013, 2014-15 (S.D.N.Y. 
1946); Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., supra note 7. 
9. Principal case at 570-71. 
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ten per cent commission on tickets it sold for the other lines. No 
explanation of the significance of this factor was offered by the 
court. Plaintiff emphasized the fact that defendant derived economic 
benefit from plaintiff's travels over the lines of the connecting 
carriers, which she felt established some legal relationship similar 
to that of a joint venture or partnership.10 In other cases where this 
argument has been made, the courts have generally required clear 
proof of the existence of a joint undertaking,11 and sharing of bene-
fits is only one of the indicia used in this determination; it is 
doubtful that the fact of some economic benefit to one party stand-
ing alone is sufficient to establish a joint venture.12 Moreover, de-
fendant's argument that it was acting only as an agent of the other 
line-as indicated by the express language of the disclaimer clause11 
-is not rebutted by the receipt of a commission,14 since payment 
based on a commission is a normal method of compensation for 
agents. And as an agent, defendant would not be liable for wrongs 
committed by other agents of the connecting carrier.111 It would 
appear, therefore, that unless the payment of a commission is itself 
held to establish a joint venture, which seems unlikely, it should 
have little significance in determining whether an initial carrier is 
liable for the torts of a connecting carrier. 
The second factor considered by the court in Ephraim was the 
phrase on the face of the tickets that they had been issued "for the 
account of" defendant. Again, no reason for the relevance of this 
fact was given by the court. It is questionable, however, whether 
that language does more than indicate the original seller of the 
coupon tickets. By this wording, connecting carriers can ascertain 
from whom to collect the portion of the fare attributable to travel 
on their lines. Furthermore, it shows to whom these carriers owe 
a commission for tickets sold. To ascribe greater significance to this 
wording seems unsupportable on the facts of the case. 
10. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 14-15, Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc., Doc. 
No. 29064, 2d Cir., 1964. 
11. See Pennsylvania R.R. v. Jones, 155 U.S. !133, 340, 344-45 (1894). 
12. Criteria used recently by other courts are found in Wooten v. Pennsylvania 
R.R., 288 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1961) (agreement to exchange equipment and per-
sonnel and to share dining car liabilities); Gates v. Greyhound Corp., 197 F. Supp. 
341 (S.D. Miss. 1960) (contract regarding maintenance, service, and rental charges 
on exchanged equipment). 
13. See note 1 supra. 
14. See Interstate Commerce Act, pt. 2, § 211(a), added by 49 Stat. 554 (1935), 
49 U.S.C. § 3ll(a) (1958), which sets out licensing procedures for those who sell 
motor carrier tickets for compensation. Specifically exempted from the license re-
quirement, however, are certified carriers who sell tickets on other lines for 
compensation when the transportation is to be furnished jointly by these lines, See 
also Administrative Ruling No. ll, Bureau of Motor Carriers, Aug. 19, 19!16, FED. 
CARR. REP. 1f 25,003 and Brown, Worcester &: N.Y. Street Ry., 4 M.C.C. 701 (1938), 
in which the Interstate Commerce Commission has implemented the policy of the acL 
15. RF.sl'ATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 358 (1958). 
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The third factor referred to by the court in the principal case 
concerned the representations made by defendant's ticket agent to 
plaintiff during the course of the sale of the ticket. The statements 
were assurances that plaintiff would have no trouble obtaining a 
seat for the entire trip.16 Plaintiff did have a reserved seat to Ra-
leigh, North Carolina, where there was a change of buses, and 
plaintiff apparently had no difficulty finding a desirable seat on this 
second bus. Plaintiff's injuries were not due to a failure on the part 
of defendant to provide a seat, but resulted from the unlawful 
attempt on the part of an independent company's agent to enforce 
segregation on a bus of the connecting line. Plaintiff admitted that 
the representations by defendant's agent did not cause defendant to 
be an "insurer or guarantor of safe passage."17 Nevertheless, the court 
held that this representation, as a part of the totality of defendant's 
conduct, subjected the issuer to liability. Other courts, in holding 
that certain statements will extend a carrier's liability, have looked 
to words in advertisements indicating control of the whole trip by 
the issuing carrier,18 to the use of language by the initial carrier 
that "we" have made arrangements with "our men" in other cities 
for the completion of a tour,19 and to statements that a specific in-
cident would not occur.20 Seemingly, no case has found a common 
carrier liable for injury on an independent line unless there are 
facts indicating both an affirmative undertaking by the carrier and 
some breach of this undertaking resulting in harm to the plaintiff. 
Thus, the principal case, under an amorphous concept of totality 
of conduct, creates liability in a common carrier in a situation ad-
mittedly otherwise controlled by the exculpatory clause. 
The basic policy consideration behind the enforcement of dis-
claimer clauses is that the initial carrier has no effective control 
over the actions of a wholly independent line and, thus, should not 
be liable for the wrongs that it could not have prevented.21 It is 
only in the area of property transportation that Congress has felt 
this policy is overridden by another, more critical, factor. In many 
instances, shippers could not ascertain at what point on the trip 
16. During the trial the following testimony was given by plaintiff: "I asked him 
(referring to defendant's employee at defendant's ticket booth in New York City) 
about a reservation for the trip. I told him I wanted to be assured I would get a 
seat all the way, because it was a long journey. He assured me I would get a seat 
on the bus." Plaintiff's Post-trial Memorandum of Law, p. 4. 
17. Brief for Plaintiff-Appcllee, pp. 10-11, Ephraim v. Safeway Trails, Inc., Doc. 
No. 29064, 2d Cir., 1964. 
18. Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N.Y. 306 (1858). 
19. Hudson v. Continental Bus Sys., Inc., 317 S.W.2d 584 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958). 
20. Louisville &: N.R.R. v. Spurling, 160 Ky. 819, 170 S.W. 192 (1914) (plaintiff 
would not be delayed by floods); Battle v. Central Greyhound Lines, Inc., 171 Misc. 
517, 13 N.Y.S.2d 357 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (Negro would not be subjected to discrimina-
tion during trip). 
21. See Louisville 8e N.R.R. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320 (1929). 
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their goods were damaged. This fact gave rise to an addition to 
the Interstate Commerce Act, making the initial or delivering 
carrier strictly liable under specific circumstances.22 On the other 
hand, the only policy consideration favoring the decision in the 
principal case seems to be that of providing a more convenient 
forum for the injured passenger. However, the continuous sale by 
defendant of tickets for the out-of-state connecting carriers would 
seem to be business transactions in New York within the meaning of 
that state's recently enacted "single act" statute.23 Therefore, since 
under the new statute a contract consummated within the state has 
been held to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over non-
resident parties to that agreement in causes of action for personal 
injuries occurring in the performance of the contract,24 plaintiff 
should have been able to sue, in New York, the independent con-
necting carrier on whose line the incident took place,:5 
22. Interstate Commerce Act, pt. 1, § 20(11), added by !14 Stat. 59!1 (1906), as 
amended, 44 Stat. 1448 (1927), 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1958). This provision is discussed 
in Alderson, Connecting Carrier's Liability for Loss or Damage to Shipments, 13 
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. !132 (1962). 
In Glaser v. Pennsylvania R.R., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d 539 (1963), the 
plaintiff contended that the omission of passengers from the coverage of this section 
was a legislative oversight which the court should correct. The court, however, re-
jected the possibility of a trial court effecting such a change in the statute. 
23. N.Y. Czv. PRAC. LAw § 302(a): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over 
any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising 
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a 
domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he: I. transacts any business 
within the state .... " See also § 301 which permits a court to exercise jurisdiction 
in all situations in which the court could have acted prior to the passage of this 
statute. 
In Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 182, 250 N.Y.S.2d 460 (Sup. Ct. 
1964), the court held that personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant had 
been acquired when its agent had confirmed hotel reservations via telephone to 
plaintiff in New York. See also Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves, 41 Misc. 2d 186, 245 
N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963). Cf. Agrashell, Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 229 F. Supp. 
98 (E.D.N.Y. 1964); Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 
1964) (in both cases, the court, in holding that jurisdiction over a nonresident had 
not been acquired, cited the absence of a contract made within the state as a 
critical factor). 
Continuous ticket sales were held to be indicative of "doing business" under prior 
New York law in Edwards v. Atlanta 8: W.P.R.R., 197 F. Supp. 686 (E.D.N.Y. 
1961); Allegue v. Gulf 8: So. Am. S.S. Co., 103 F. Supp. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Rothenberg 
v. Western Pac. R.R., 206 App. Div. 52, 200 N.Y. Supp. 428 (1923); Berner v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 2 Misc. 2d 260, 149 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1956), afj'd, 3 N.Y.2d 1003, 
147 N.E.2d 7!12, 170 N.Y.S.2d !140 (1957). 
24. See, e.g., Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Co., supra note 23, where personal injury 
suffered at defendant's hotel was held to be a proper cause of action "arising" out 
of the New York contract transaction. See statute cited note 23 supra. See also Tauza 
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 268-69, 115 N.E. 915, 918 (1917), where the court, 
per Cardozo, J., held that once the foreign corporation was found to be doing 
business in New York, the cause of action need not have arisen in the state. But see 
Peters v. Robin Airlines, 281 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d I (1953). 
25. The new statute has been held to be applicable retroactively since it is only 
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The principal case creates uncertainty in the field of passenger 
carrier liability. Since the Interstate Commerce Act provides that 
the Commission may establish through routes and joint rates,26 
motor carriers cannot escape this extended liability by refusing to 
sell tickets on other than their own lines. Passenger carriers are thus 
faced with the problem of applying the criteria set out by this 
court to their o-wn particular situations and attempting thereby to 
measure their potential liability. There are, however, no adequate 
guidelines. No indication is given by the court of the importance 
of any one of the three factors enumerated, nor is anything said 
about their interrelationship. The emphasis placed on the totality 
of the factors by the court seems to suggest that all three were 
necessary to the decision. Individually, however, none of the factors 
is supportable by law as sufficient to vitiate the exculpatory provi-
sion of the ticket. It is not clear, therefore, whether the court would 
have reached a similar result if only one or two of these factors had 
been present. 
When a court renders ineffective the recognized efficacy of a dis-
claimer clause, its reasons for so doing should be explicit. Without 
a clearer exposition than was given in the principal case, the tend-
ency will be toward indeterminate liability for these carriers. It is 
likely that this will result in an increase in insurance premiums,27 
leading to a higher cost of transportation for the public. And though 
the initial carrier, or its insurer, may sue the connecting carrier 
who caused the injury,28 the consequent increase in litigation would 
seem to offset any policy considerations in favor of providing the 
plaintiff with a convenient forum. The situation presented in tpe 
principal case should not precipitate a judicial reversal of an ac-
cepted trend in passenger carrier liability. 
of a procedural nature. Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 
427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964). 
26. Interstate Commerce Act, pL 2, § 216, added by, 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. 
§ 316 (1958). 
27. In determining rates for liability policies, the insurance industry relies heavily 
on experience. The speculation that is caused by the Ephraim decision would seem 
to indicate at least a temporary rise in these rates. Items which would require careful 
analysis would include: (1) the number of plaintiffs who return to their home states 
to sue the issuing carrier, (2) the changing significance of the territorial classification 
previously applied to the initial carrier, and (3) the variance in the loss per unit of 
exposure ratio, due to the increase in passenger miles for which each carrier would 
be potentially liable. See generally HENSLEY, COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN NONLIFE INSURANCE 78-85 (1962) and MICHELBACHER, MULTIPLE-
LINE INSURANCE chs. 5-6 (1957). The effect of insurance on negligence law is discussed 
in Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW 8: CoNTEMP. 
PROB. 219 (1953), and James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability 
Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948). 
28. It has been held that the carriers who are strictly liable under 49 U.S.C. 
§ 20(11) (1958) have a right to pursue the connecting carrier on whose line the damage 
occurred. Keystone Motor Freight Lines v. Brannon-Signaigo Cigar Co., 115 F.2d 
736, 740 (5th Cir. 1940). See generally CUSHMAN, TRANSPORTATION LAW 231-32 (1951). 
